Thursday, July 31, 2014

Hacking Washington DC traffic control systems

By Cesar Cerrudo @cesarcer

This is a short blog post, because I’ve talked about this topic in the past. I want to let people know that I have the honor of presenting at DEF CON on Friday, August 8, 2014, at 1:00 PM. My presentation is entitled “Hacking US (and UK, Australia, France, Etc.) Traffic Control Systems. I hope to see you all there. I'm sure you will like the presentation.

I am frustrated with Sensys Networks (vulnerable devices vendor) lack of cooperation, but I realize that I should be thankful. This has prompted me to further my research and try different things, like performing passive onsite tests on real deployments in cities like Seattle, New York, and Washington DC. I’m not so sure these cities are equally as thankful, since they have to deal with thousands of installed vulnerable devices, which are currently being used for critical traffic control.

The latest Sensys Networks numbers indicate that approximately 200,000 sensor devices are deployed worldwide. See http://www.trafficsystemsinc.com/newsletter/spring2014.html. Based on a unit cost of approximately $500, approximately $100,000,000 of vulnerable equipment is buried in roads around the world that anyone can hack. I’m also concerned about how much it will cost tax payers to fix and replace the equipment.

One way I confirmed that Sensys Networks devices were vulnerable was by traveling to Washington DC to observe a large deployment that I got to know, as this video shows: 



When I exited the train station, the fun began, as you can see in this video. (Thanks to Ian Amit for the pictures and videos.)



Disclaimer: no hacking was performed. I just looked at wireless data with a wireless sniffer and an access point displaying it graphically using Sensys Networks software along with sniffer software; no data was modified and no protections were bypassed. I just confirmed that communications were not encrypted and that sensors and repeaters could be completely controlled with no authentication necessary.

Maybe the devices are intentionally vulnerable so that the Secret Service can play with them when Cadillac One is around. :)

As you can see, Washington DC and many cities around the world will remain vulnerable until Sensys Networks takes action. In the meantime, I really hope no one does hack these devices causing traffic problems and accidents.

I would recommend a close monitoring of these systems, watch for any malfunction, and always have secondary controls in place. These types of devices should be security audited before being used to avoid this kind of problems and to increase their security. Vendors should also be required, in some way, to properly document and publish the security controls, functionality, and so on, of their products in order to quickly determine if they are good and secure.

See you at DEFCON!


By the way, I will also be at IOAsis (http://ioasislasvegas.eventbrite.com/?aff=PRIOASIS), so come through for a discussion and demo.


Wednesday, July 30, 2014

DC22 Talk: Killing the Rootkit

By Shane Macaulay

I'll  be at DefCon22 a to present information about a high assurance tool/technique that helps to detect hidden processes (hidden by a DKOM type rootkit).  It works very well with little bit testing required (not very "abortable" http://takahiroharuyama.github.io/blog/2014/04/21/memory-forensics-still-aborted/). The process  also works recursively (detect host and guest processes inside a host memory dump).


Plus, I will also be at our IOAsis (http://ioasislasvegas.eventbrite.com/?aff=PRIOASIS) , so come through for a discussion and a demo.

Monday, June 16, 2014

Video: Building Custom Android Malware for Penetration Testing

By Robert Erbes  @rr_dot 

In this presentation, I provide a brief overview of the Android environment and a somewhat philosophical discussion of malware. I also take look at possible Android attacks in order to help you test your organization's defenses against the increasingly common Bring Your Own Device scenario.


Wednesday, May 7, 2014

Glass Reflections in Pictures + OSINT = More Accurate Location

By Alejandro Hernández - @nitr0usmx

Disclaimer: The aim of this article is to help people to be more careful when taking pictures through windows because they might reveal their location inadvertently. The technique presented here might be used for many different purposes, such as to track down the location of the bad guys, to simply know in which hotel is that nice room or by some people, to follow the tracks of their favorite artist.
All of the pictures presented here were posted by the owners on Twitter. The tools and information used to determine the locations where the pictures were taken are all publically available on the Internet. No illegal actions were performed in the work presented here. 


Introduction

Travelling can be enriching and inspiring, especially if you’re in a place you haven’t been before. Whether on vacation or travelling for business, one of the first things that people usually do, including myself, after arriving in their hotel room, is turn on the lights (even if daylight is still coming through the windows), jump on the bed to feel how comfortable it is, walk to the window, and admire the view. If you like what you see, sometimes you grab your camera and take a picture, regardless of reflections in the window.

Wednesday, April 30, 2014

Hacking US (and UK, Australia, France, etc.) Traffic Control Systems



By Cesar Cerrudo @cesarcer


Hacking like in the movies

Probably many of you have watched scenes from "Live Free or Die Hard" (Die Hard 4) where "terrorist hackers" manipulate traffic signals by just hitting Enter or typing a few keys. I wanted to do that! I started to look around, and while I couldn't exactly do the same thing (too Hollywood style!), I got pretty close. I found some interesting devices used by traffic control systems in important US cities, and I could hack them :) These devices are also 
used in cities in the UK, France, Australia, China, etc., making them even more interesting.








After getting the devices, it wasn't difficult to find vulnerabilities (actually, it was more difficult to make them work properly, but that's another story).

Wednesday, April 23, 2014

Hacking the Java Debug Wire Protocol - or - “How I met your Java debugger”

By Christophe Alladoum - @_hugsy_

TL;DR: turn any open JDWP service into reliable remote code execution (exploit inside)

<plagiarism> Kids, I’m gonna tell you an incredible story. </plagiarism>
This is the story of how I came across an interesting protocol during a recent engagement for IOActive and turned it into a reliable way to execute remote code. In this post, I will explain the Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP) and why it is interesting from a pentester’s point of view. I will cover some JDWP internals and how to use them to perform code execution, resulting in a reliable and universal exploitation script. So let’s get started.

Disclaimer: This post provides techniques and exploitation code that should not be used against vulnerable environments without prior authorization. The author cannot be held responsible for any private use of the tool or techniques described therein.

Note: As I was looking into JDWP, I stumbled upon two brief posts on the same topic (see [5] (in French) and [6]). They are worth reading, but do not expect that a deeper understanding of the protocol itself will allow you to reliably exploit it. This post does not reveal any 0-day exploits, but instead thoroughly covers JDWP from a pentester/attacker perspective. 

Thursday, April 17, 2014

A Wake-up Call for SATCOM Security

By Ruben Santamarta @reversemode

During the last few months we have witnessed a series of events that will probably be seen as a tipping point in the public’s opinion about the importance of, and need for, security. The revelations of Edward Snowden have served to confirm some theories and shed light on surveillance technologies that were long restricted.

We live in a world where an ever-increasing stream of digital data is flowing between continents. It is clear that those who control communications traffic have an upper-hand.

Satellite Communications (SATCOM) plays a vital role in the global telecommunications system. Sectors that commonly rely on satellite networks include:
  • Aerospace
  • Maritime
  • Military and governments
  • Emergency services
  • Industrial (oil rigs, gas, electricity)
  • Media
It is important to mention that certain international safety regulations for ships such as GMDSS or aircraft's ACARS rely on satellite communication links. In fact, we recently read how, thanks to the SATCOM equipment on board Malaysian Airlines MH370, Inmarsat engineers were able to determine the approximate position of where the plane crashed. 

IOActive is committed to improving overall security. The only way to do so is to analyze the security posture of the entire supply chain, from the silicon level to the upper layers of software. 

Thus, in the last quarter of 2013 I decided to research into a series of devices that, although widely deployed, had not received the attention they actually deserve. The goal was to provide an initial evaluation of the security posture of the most widely deployed Inmarsat and Iridium SATCOM terminals.  

In previous blog posts I've explained the common approach when researching complex devices that are not physically accessible. In these terms, this research is not much different than the previous research: in most cases the analysis was performed by reverse engineering the firmware statically.


What about the results? 

Insecure and undocumented protocols, backdoors, hard-coded credentials...mainly design flaws that allow remote attackers to fully compromise the affected devices using multiple attack vectors.

Ships, aircraft, military personnel, emergency services, media services, and industrial facilities (oil rigs, gas pipelines, water treatment plants, wind turbines, substations, etc.) could all be affected by these vulnerabilities.

I hope this research is seen as a wake-up call for both the vendors and users of the current generation of SATCOM technology. We will be releasing full technical details in several months, at Las Vegas, so stay tuned.
The following white paper comprehensively explains all the aspects of this research http://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_SATCOM_Security_WhitePaper.pdf