Thursday, October 16, 2014

Vicious POODLE Finally Kills SSL

By Robert Zigweid

The poodle must be the most vicious dog, because it has killed SSL. 

POODLE is the latest in a rather lengthy string of vulnerabilities in SSL (Secure Socket Layer) and a more recent protocol, TLS (Transport layer Security). Both protocols secure data that is being sent between applications to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery

POODLE (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption) rings the death knell for our 18-year-old friend SSL version 3.0 (SSLv3), because at this point, there is no truly safe way to continue using it.  

Google announced Tuesday that its researchers had discovered POODLE. The announcement came amid rumors about the researchers’ security advisory white paper which details the vulnerability, which was circulating internally.

SSLv3 had survived numerous prior vulnerabilities, including SSL renegotiation, BEAST, CRIME, Lucky 13, and RC4 weakness. Finally, its time has come; SSLv3 is long overdue for deprecation.

The security industry’s initial view is that POODLE will not be as devastating as other recent vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, a TLS bug. After all, POODLE is a client-side attack; the others were direct server-side attacks.  

However, I believe POODLE will ultimately have a larger overall impact than Heartbleed. Even the hundreds of thousands of applications that use a more recent TLS protocol still use SSLv3 as part of backward compatibility. In addition, some applications that directly use SSLv3 may not support any version of TLS; for these, there might not be a quick fix, if there will be one at all.  

POODLE attacks the SSLv3 block ciphers by abusing the non-deterministic nature of block cipher padding of CBC ciphers. The Message Authentication Code (MAC), which checks the integrity of every message after decryption, does not cover these padding bytes. What does this mean? The padding can’t be fully verified. In other words, this attack is very capable of determining the value of HTTPS cookies. This is the heart of the problem. That might not seem like a huge issue until you consider that this may be a session cookie, and the user’s session could be potentially compromised.

TLS version 1.0 (TLSv1.0) and higher versions are not affected by POODLE because these protocols are strict about the contents of the padding bytes. Therefore, TLSv1.0 is still considered safe for CBC mode ciphers. However, we shouldn’t let that lull us into complacency. Keep in mind that even the clients and servers that support recent TLS versions can force the use of SSLv3 by downgrading the transmission channel, which is often still supported. This ‘downgrade dance’ can be triggered through a variety of methods. What’s important to know is that it can happen.

There are a few ways to prevent POODLE from affecting your communication:

Plan A: Disable SSLv3 for all applications. This is the most effective mitigation for both clients and servers.  

Plan B: As an alternative, you could disable all CBC Ciphers for SSLv3. This will protect you from POODLE, but leaves only RC4 as the remaining “strong” cryptographic ciphers, which as mentioned above has had weaknesses in the past.

Plan C: If an application must continue supporting SSLv3 in order work correctly, implement the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV mechanism. Some vendors are taking this approach for now, but it is a coping technique, not a solution. It addresses problems with retried connections and prevents reversion to earlier protocols, as described in the document TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks (Draft Released for Comments).  

How to Implement Plan A

With no solution that would allow truly safe continued use of SSLv3, you should implement Plan A: Disable SSLv3 for both server and client applications wherever possible, as described below.

Disable SSLv3 for Browsers 

Browser
 Disabling instructions
Chrome:
Add the command line -ssl-version-min=tls1 so the browser uses TLSv1.0 or higher.
Internet: Explorer:
Go to IE’s Tools menu -> Internet Options -> Advanced tab. Near the bottom of the tab, clear the Use SSL 3.0 checkbox.
Firefox:
Type about:config in the address bar and set security.tls.version.min to 1.
Adium/Pidgin:
 Clear the Force Old-Style SSL checkbox.

Note: Some browser vendors are already issuing patches and others are offering diagnostic tools to assess connectivity.

If your device has multiple users, secure the browsers for every user. Your mobile browsers are vulnerable as well. 

Disable SSLv3 on Server Software 

Server Software 
   Disabling instructions
Apache:
Add -SSLv3 to the SSLProtocol line.
IIS 7:
Because this is an involved process that requires registry tweaking and a reboot, please refer to Microsoft’s instructions: https://support.microsoft.com/kb/187498/en-us
Postfix:
In main.cf, adopt the setting smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols=!SSLv3 and         ensure that !SSLv2 is present too.

Stay alert for news from your application vendors about patches and recommendations.
POODLE is a high risk for payment gateways and other applications that might expose credit card data and must be fixed in 30 days, according to Payment Card Industry standards. The clock is ticking.  


Conclusion 

Ideally, the security industry should move to recent versions of the TLS protocol. Each iteration has brought improvements, yet adoption has been slow. For instance, TLS version 1.2, introduced in mid-2008, was scarcely implemented until recently and many services that support TLSv1.2 are still required to support the older TLSv1.0, because the clients don’t yet support the newer protocol version.  

A draft of TLS version 1.3 released in July 2014 removes support for features that were discovered to make encrypted data vulnerable. Our world will be much safer if we quickly embrace it. 


References 


Thursday, September 18, 2014

A Dirty Distillation of Proposed V2V Readiness

By Chris Valasek @nudehaberdasher

Good Afternoon Internet
Chris Valasek here. You may remember me from such automated information kiosks as "Welcome to Springfield Airport", and "Where's Nordstrom?" Ever since Dr. Charlie Miller and I began our car hacking adventures, we’ve been asked about the upcoming Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) initiative and haven’t had much to say because we only knew about the technology in the abstract. 
I finally decided to read the proposed documentation from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) titled: “Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications: Readiness of V2V Technology for Application” (http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/V2V/Readiness-of-V2V-Technology-for-Application-812014.pdf). This is my distillation of a very small portion of the 327-page document. 

While there are countless pages of information regarding cost, crash statistics, consumer acceptance, policy, legal liability, and fuel economy, as a breaker of things, I was most interested in any technical information I could extract. In this blog post, I list some interesting bits I stumbled upon when reading the document. I skipped over huge portions I felt weren’t applicable to my investigation. Mainly anything that didn’t have to do with a purely technical implementation. In addition, any diagrams or pictures in this blog post were taken directly from “Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications: Readiness of V2V Technology for Application”. 


A Very Brief History

Although currently a hot topic in the automotive world, the planning, design, and testing of the V2V infrastructure started over 11 years ago. It has gone from special purpose lanes in San Diego to a wireless infrastructure designed to be transparent to the end user. For those not in the know, a pilot program was deployed in Ann Arbor, MI from August 2012 to February 2014. This isn’t a harebrained scheme to a long-standing problem, but has been thought about and fine-tuned for quite some time. 


Overview

The V2V system is designed (obviously) to reduce death, injuries, and economic loss from motor vehicle crashes. Many people, including me, didn’t realize this initial proposal is only designed to provide visual and audible warnings to the driver and DOES NOT include or plan for physical alterations of the automobile based on V2V communications. For example, the V2V system will not brake a car in the event of an impending accident, but only warn the driver to apply the brake (although V2V could be used by current in-car systems, such as Collision Avoidance, to augment their functionality). 


The main components: 

Forward Collision Warning (FCW) – Warns you if you’re about to smash into something in front of you.

Emergency Electronic Brake Lights – Warns you when the person in front of you is slowing down while you’re reading your Twitter feed. 

Do Not Pass Warning – Really for unintentional drift more than you trying to push the limit to pass that big rig on the left side of the dotted line.

Left Turn Assist (LTA) -- Warns you if there is a car coming when making a left turn. 

Intersection Movement Assist (IMA) – Figuring out how not to smash into several different cars at a 4-way intersection is hard, let’s go shopping!

Blind Spot Warning + Lane Change Warning – Warns you if you’re about to smash into something while changing lanes. No more “Rubbin is racin” I guess. 
This picture gives you a better idea of some of the scenarios mentioned above. 


You’ll notice that none of the safety mechanisms mentioned earlier involve performing any physical actions on the automobile. The designers of the V2V system realize that false positives could be a huge problem with warnings. Just imagine how scared people would be if their automobile braked or steered without cause in an attempt to protect them. 

Notable Items: 
  • The document predicts it will take 37 years for V2V to penetrate an entire fleet.
  • Rear and Forward Collision Warnings appear to be capable of saving the most money.
  • NHSTA does not expect an immediate difference, due to lack of adoption, but hopes to gain ground as time goes on.

My Thoughts

All these features seem like they will greatly increase vehicle and passenger safety. My one concern is a whole V2V infrastructure is being developed without much thought given to the physical control of a vehicle. It seems like the next logical step is to not only warn drivers if they are about to collide, but to prevent it. Maybe this will always be left up to the manufacturer, maybe not. 


Components/Terms

On Board Equipment (OBE) – The device in your car that will communicate with the V2V infrastructure. It will either be OEM (put there by the manufacturer) or aftermarket (sold separately from the car, mobile phone, standalone device, and so on). 

Road Side Equipment (RSE) – These devices will connect to the vehicles around them. They can be on road curves that warn the car about its speed, traffic lights, stop signs, and so on. 

Dedicated Short-range Communications (DSRC) – The short-range wireless communications that RSE and OBE use to communicate.

Driver Vehicle Interface (DVI) – This interface will display the V2V warnings.
Basic Safety Message (BSM) – This is a message sent to and received from other OBE and RSE devices to make the V2V system work. For example, it could announce the current speed of the vehicle.

Security Credentials Management System (SCMS) – The systems that manage all of the credentials for V2V systems, such as the certificates used to authenticate BSMs. 


Communications

The most interesting portion of the document for me was the technical information about the underlying communications system. I think many people want to understand what kind of wireless communications will be implemented for the vehicles and devices with which they will interact. 

The V2V infrastructure will operate on the 5.8 – 5.9 GHz band (5850 – 5925 MHz) using seven (7) non-overlapping 10 MHz channels, with a 5 MHz guard band at the beginning of each frequency range. Channel 172 will be used to send public safety information. 

Since these devices, much like your AM/FM radio, can only be on one channel at a time, switching is necessary. Switching between the Control Channel (CCH) and Service Channel (SCH) occurs every 50 ms to transmit or receive DSRC messages emitted by other vehicles or RSE. There is a 4 ms front guard leaving only 46 percent of “potentially” available bandwidth for BSM transmissions. 

DSRC messages will be broadcast (omnidirectional for up to 300 meters) on a standardized network (IEEE 1609.4) over a standardized wireless layer IEEE 802.11p. The chart below shows all of the system standards currently anticipated for the first generation V2V system. 











BSM messages also have a certain format, which is partially listed below. Please see the original document for more detailed information. Each message should have a packet size of 200 – 500 bytes with a maximum required range of 50 – 300 meters. 


Note: This is a partial snippet of the BSM Part II contents.

One main take away was that BSM messages are NOT encrypted; therefore, they could be viewed over the air by interested parties. The messages are, however, authenticated via a signing mechanism (discussed in the next section). 

Notable Items:

NHSTA is unsure if current WiFi infrastructure will interfere with the communications based on the devices. The claim is that more research is required. 

NHSTA claims the system will NOT collect or store any data identifying individuals or individual vehicles, nor will it create the ability for the government to do so.

NHSTA claims it would be extremely difficult for third parties to use the system to track a vehicle.

“NHTSA is aware of concerns that the V2V system could broadcast or store BSM data (such as GPS or path history) that, if captured by a third party, might facilitate very-localized vehicle tracking. In fact, the broadcast of unencrypted GPS, path history, and other data characteristics in or derived from the BSM appears to introduce only very limited potential risks to individual privacy.”
“It is theoretically possible that a third party could try to capture the transitory locational data in order to track a specific vehicle. However, we do not see a scenario in which one wishing to track a vehicle would choose the V2V system as the means.”

“To date, NHTSA’s V2V research has not included research specific to this issue, as researchers assumed that the possibility of cyber-attacks on motor vehicles was an existing vector of risk – not a new one created by V2V technologies."

My Thoughts:

This is an amazingly complex system that is going to send, receive, and analyze data in real-time.

It will be interesting to see if people figure out how to use BSM messages to track vehicles or enumerate personal information due to their lack of encryption.
It looks like you could use BSM messages to gather information and track a vehicle, but I’m unsure of the practicality of doing so.

I don’t really know enough about radio/wireless to comment much more, but I’d love to hear other people’s thoughts. 


Security

The V2V system, while sending a majority of the information in cleartext, does have mechanisms that are designed for security. After much internal debate, it was decided that a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) would be implemented to prove authenticity when sending and receiving messages. I think we’re all familiar with the PKI system, since we use it every day on the Internet to do our banking, chatting, and general internetting. Because this is a blog post, I only sampled a small set of the information available in the document. Also, I’m far from a crypto expert and will do my best to briefly explain the system that is being implemented. Please excuse or correct any errors you see with a quick tweet to @nudehaberdasher.

As stated before, BSMs are NOT encrypted, but verified with a digital signature, meaning that each message must be signed before it is sent and checked upon receipt. This trust system is a requirement, since thousands of messages will be authenticated in real-time when driving a vehicle that uses the V2V system. 

Like our Internet PKI system, there is a Certificate Authority (CA) but, to quote the paper: 
“We note that the interactions between the components shown in Figure <not-shown> are all based on machine-to-machine performance. No human judgment is involved in creation, granting, or revocation of the digital certificates.”

This means that there will not be human involvement when putting new devices on the V2V system. 

A simplified version of the system can be seen below. 

Obviously the system is much more complex, involving preinstalled certificates, which are supposed to last five minutes each, a signing authority, and even a misbehavior authority responsible for revoking certificates for a variety of reasons. A comparison between the V2V PKI system and the PKI system we currently use on the Internet is illustrated below. 

“Initial deployment is assumed to last for three years, and requires that OBEs on newly manufactured vehicles download a three-year batch of certificates. These batches would include reusable, overlapping five-minute certificates valid for one week. The term “overlapping” in this context refers to the fact that any certificate can be used at any time during the validity period. The batches would be good for one week and at this point are assumed to be around 20 certificates per week, which equates to 1,040 for one year of certificates. As the frequency of the certificate download batch changes for full deployment, the number and therefore size of the certificate batches also changes accordingly.”




































It looks as if there are two options for preinstalled certificates, which will be placed there by OEMs and aftermarket solution providers:

Option 1: Three-year reusable, non-overlapping five-minute certificates

Option 2: Three-year batches of reusable, overlapping, 260 five-minute certificates valid for one week

Certificates will be managed by the SCMS and communications with devices will go as follows: 
  • UPLOAD - a request for new certificates
  • DOWNLOAD - new certificates
  • UPLOAD - a misbehavior report
  • DOWNLOAD – a full/partial CRL
  • Conduct other data functions or system updates
Certificate renewal, updates, and revocation still seem to be up in the air. Certificate downloads could happen through cellular, WiFi, or DSRC. The most likely scenario will be DSRC due to cost and availability issues. New certificates could be updated in-full on a daily basis, or the system could use incremental updates to save time and bandwidth. 

While the design of the system seems to be pretty well developed, the details of the implementation and ownership still seem to be undecided. It looks like only time will tell who will own and administer this system and in what fashion it will be administered. 

Notable Items:

“As no decisions about ownership or operation have been made, we do not advocate for public or private ownership, but include the basic functions we expect the SCMS Manager would perform in our discussions and analyses.”

“Most SCMS functions listed above are fairly well developed. One critical function, which has not yet been fleshed out adequately for DOT to assess, is the Misbehavior Authority (MA) -- the central function responsible for processing misbehavior reports generated by OBE and producing and publishing the CRL.”

“Global detection processes have not yet been defined.”

Research into the PKI system will continue into 2016. 

“Publication of the seed is sufficient to revoke all certificates belonging to the revoked device, but without the seed an eavesdropper cannot tell which certificates belong to a particular device. (Note: the revocation process is designed such that it does not give up backward privacy.)”

Internal Blacklist – This would be used by the SCMS to make sure that an OBE asking for new certificates is not on the revoked list. If a vehicle or device is on the list, no certificate updates will be issued.

My Thoughts:

Be it that devices with valid certificates and valid certificate updates will be the hands of an ‘attacker’, I’m interested to see how well the certificate revocation functionality works. 

Without any decision on certificate revocation, will it be implemented? If so, will it be done correctly and robustly? 

How fast can certificates be revoked? 

Sending spoofed, legitimately signed messages for even five minutes at a busy intersection could cause a massive disruption. 

Private keys are going to be in infrastructure devices, meaning there’s a good chance they won’t be ‘private’ for long. 

Crypto people do your crypto thing on this. 


Conclusion

I think the V2V technology is very interesting but still has many questions to answer, due to its massive technical complexity and huge economic cost. Additionally, I don’t think people have much to be worried about in the first iteration since there are only audible and visual warnings to the driver, without any direct effect on the vehicle. 

I hope that, when developing these systems, planning and design would be considered around vehicle control and not only warnings, as it seems like true V2V accident avoidance is the next logical step. Additionally, there is probably a good chance that current vehicle bus infrastructure is used to provide warnings to the driver, which means there is yet another remote entry point to the vehicle which potentially uses the vehicle’s network for communication. From an attacker’s perspective, all remote communication systems that interact with the car will be seen as attack surfaces. 

My last thought is that a true V2V infrastructure is further away than many people think. While we may have fringe devices in the coming years, full fleet adoption isn’t expected until 2037, so we can all go back to worrying about our robot overlords taking over in 2029. 

Special Thanks: Charlie Miller (@0xcharlie) and Zach Lanier (@quine


Wednesday, September 10, 2014

Killing the Rootkit

By Shane Macaulay


Cross-platform, cross-architecture DKOM detection

To know if your system is compromised, you need to find everything that could run or otherwise change state on your system and verify its integrity (that is, check that the state is what you expect it to be).

“Finding everything” is a bold statement, particularly in the realm of computer security, rootkits, and advanced threats. Is it possible to find everything? Sadly, the short answer is no, it’s not. Strangely, the long answer is yes, it is.

By defining the execution environment at any point in time, predominantly through the use of hardware-based hypervisor or virtualization facilities, you can verify the integrity of that specific environment using cryptographically secure hashing.

Despite the relative ease of hash integrity checks, applying them to memory presents a number of significant challenges; the most difficult being identifying all of the processes that may execute on a system. System process control registers describe the virtual-to-physical memory layout. Only after all processes are found can integrity verification of code, data, and static/structural analysis be conducted.

These articles present recent work on understanding and detecting DKOM classes of rootkits:
http://jessekornblum.com/presentations/dodcc11-2.pdf
http://bsodtutorials.blogspot.ca/2014/01/rootkits-direct-kernel-object.html

“DKOM is one of the methods commonly used and implemented by Rootkits, in order to remain undetected, since this the main purpose of a rootkit.” – Harry Miller

Detecting DKOM-based processes has largely been conducted at the logical layer (see the seven different techniques https://code.google.com/p/volatility/wiki/CommandReference#psxview). This is prone to failure and iterative evasion since most process detection techniques are based on recognizing OS artifacts.


Finding Processes by Page Table Detection

When an OS starts up a process, it establishes the ability for virtual memory to be used (to enable memory protection), by creating a page table. The page table is itself a single page of physical memory (0x1000 bytes). It is usually allocated by way of a cache-optimized mechanism, which makes locating it somewhat complicated. Fortunately, we can identify a page table by understanding several established (hardware) requirements for its construction.

Even if an attacker significantly modifies and attempts to hide from standard logical object scanning, there is no way to evade page-table detection without significantly patching the OS fault handler. A major benefit to a DKOM rootkit is that it avoids code patches, that level of modification is easily detected by integrity checks and is counter to the goal of DKOM. DKOM is a codeless rootkit technique, it runs code without patching the OS to hide itself, it only patches data pointers.

IOActive released several versions of this process detection technique. We also built it into our memory integrity checking tools, BlockWatch™ and The Memory Cruncher™.


Process-based Page Table Detection

Any given page of memory could be a page table. Typically a page table is organized as a series of page table entries (PTEs). These entries are usually traversed by selecting some bits from a virtual address and converting them into a series of table lookups.

The magic of this technique comes from the propensity of all OS (at least Windows, Linux, and BSD) to organize their page tables into virtual memory. That way they can use virtual addresses to edit PTEs instead of physical memory addresses.



By making all of the offsets the same with the entry at that offset pointing back to the page table base value (CR3), the page table can essentially be accessed through this special virtual address. Refer to the Linux article for an exhaustive explanation of why this is useful. 


Physical Memory Page 

If we consider any given page of random physical memory, we can detect the following offsets as a valid PTE. Windows has proven to consume, for every process, entry 0, entry 0x1ED (self map), and a couple of additional kernel regions (consistent across all Win64 versions).



PTE Format

typedef struct _HARDWARE_PTE {
    ULONGLONG Valid : 1; Indicates hardware or software handling (Mode 1 and 2)
    ULONGLONG Write : 1; 
    ULONGLONG Owner : 1;
    ULONGLONG WriteThrough : 1;
    ULONGLONG CacheDisable : 1;
    ULONGLONG Accessed : 1;
    ULONGLONG Dirty : 1;
    ULONGLONG LargePage : 1; Mode 2 
    ULONGLONG Global : 1;
    ULONGLONG CopyOnWrite : 1;
    ULONGLONG Prototype : 1; Mode 2
    ULONGLONG reserved0 : 1;
    ULONGLONG PageFrameNumber : 36; PFN, always incrementing (Mode 1 and 2)
    ULONGLONG reserved1 : 4;
    ULONGLONG SoftwareWsIndex : 11; Mode 2 
    ULONGLONG NoExecute : 1;
} HARDWARE_PTE, *PHARDWARE_PTE;

By checking the physical memory offsets we expect, extracting a candidate entry, we can determine if the physical page is a valid page table (see MProcDetect.cs for implementation). There are a number of properties we understand about physical memory: the address of page frame number (PFN) will always increase from earlier pages and will not be larger than the current linear position + memory gap ranges.  


What About Shadow Walker Tricks?

Shadow walker abuses the nature of the TLB of a running system. Execution may occur at a different address than when reading. If you look/scan/check memory, the address will be cloaked onto what you expect when reading, while execution will actually occur somewhere different.

This is one reason why we analyze memory extracted from a hypervisor “guest” OS snapshot. Analyzing memory from behind a hypervisor establishes a “semantic gap” that ensures our static memory analysis includes all possible memory pages, unaffected by split I/D TLB games.


What About Hardware Rootkits?

Using a hypervisor makes verifying device memory easy. Verification at the host or physical layer is extremely complicated. Different hardware vendors have vastly different ways to extract and interact with firmware, UEFI may be verifiable with Copernicus2 or other tools.

In order for a hypervisor to be effected by a hardware rootkit, the hypervisor has to have been “escaped”, which is currently a rare and valuable exploit. It is probably not worth risking such a valuable exploit for a hardware rootkit that can be mitigated by the network. Extracting physical system memory in a consistent way (immune to attack and evasion) has historically been very hard.
If you are concerned about hardware rootkits, there are some extreme techniques that may help.


IOActive has Everything

Now that we have established a method for finding everything, the next task is relatively simple. Do some checking to ensure that what we found is what we expected.
Using cryptographically secure hash checks in a whitelist fashion is a straight-forward and hard-to-attack technique for integrity verification.
IOActive’s current solution, BlockWatch™, does just that. It manages memory extraction and hash checking that testifies to what we have found.


Weird Rootkits

I classify “weird rootkits” as anything from a RoP-based rootkit to some form of script injection or anything else where the attacker can coerce an application to behave in an unexpected (and rootkit-like) way.  

Detecting a RoP is actually quite easy (stack checking a memory snapshot). I covered some of this in a CanSecWest presentation I gave earlier this year. Each return address on a stack must be preceded by a call instruction. You can then validate that the opcode exists and the return address is not spurious (as is the case for a RoP attack). RoP stacks are also exceedingly large and are atypical of normal threads.

What about other attacks, rootkits implemented in server scripts and anything else? If we have found the address spaces for all of the processes and are able to validate the integrity of all of the kernel code, then any scripts or weird rootkits will be observable through normal profiling and logging interfaces.


Summary

By leveraging the unique ability of a hypervisor to expose the physical memory of a system in a way that is consistent (not modified by an attacker), we can use a high-assurance process detection technique combined with integrity checking to detect any rootkit.


Additional References

Tuesday, August 19, 2014

Silly Bugs That Can Compromise Your Social Media Life

By Ariel Sanchez

A few months ago while I was playing with my smartphone, I decided to intercept traffic to see what it was sending. The first thing that caught my attention was the iOS Instagram app. For some reason, the app sent a request using a Facebook access token through an HTTP plain-text communication.

Thursday, August 14, 2014

Remote survey paper (car hacking)

Good Afternoon Interwebs, 
Chris Valasek here. You may remember me from such nature films as “Earwigs: Eww”
Charlie and I are finally getting around to publicly releasing our remote survey paper. I thought this went without saying but, to reiterate, we did NOT physically look at the cars that we discussed. The survey was designed as a high level overview of the information that we acquired from the mechanic’s sites for each manufacturer. The ‘Hackability’ is based upon our previous experience with automobiles, attack surface, and network structure. 
Enjoy! 


  • cv & cm 

Tuesday, August 5, 2014

Upcoming Blackhat & DEF CON talk: A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces

Hi Internet,

Chris Valasek here; you may remember me from such movies as ‘They Came to Burgle Carnegie Hall’. In case you haven’t heard, Dr. Charlie Miller and I will be giving a presentation at Black Hat and DEF CON titled ‘A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces’. You may have seen some press coverage on Wired, CNN, and Dark Reading several days ago. I really think they all did a fantastic job covering what we’ll be talking about.

We are going to look at a bunch of cars’ network topology, cyber physical features, and remote attack surfaces. We are also going to show a video of our automotive intrusion prevention/detection system.

While I’m sure many of you want find out which car we think is most hackable (and you will), we don’t want that to be the focus of our research. The biggest problem we faced while researching the Toyota Prius and Ford Escape was the small sample set. We were able to dive deeply into two vehicles, but the biggest downfall was only learning about two specific vehicles.

Our research and presentation focus on understanding the technology and implementations, at a high level, for several major automotive manufacturers. We feel that by examining how different manufacturers design their automotive networks, we’ll be able to make more general comments about vehicle security, instead of only referencing the two aforementioned automobiles.

I hope to see everyone in Vegas and would love it if you show up for our talk. It’s at 11:45 AM in Lagoon K on Wednesday August 6.

-- CV

P.S. Come to the talk for some semi-related, never-before-seen hacks.

Thursday, July 31, 2014

Hacking Washington DC traffic control systems

By Cesar Cerrudo @cesarcer

This is a short blog post, because I’ve talked about this topic in the past. I want to let people know that I have the honor of presenting at DEF CON on Friday, August 8, 2014, at 1:00 PM. My presentation is entitled “Hacking US (and UK, Australia, France, Etc.) Traffic Control Systems. I hope to see you all there. I'm sure you will like the presentation.

I am frustrated with Sensys Networks (vulnerable devices vendor) lack of cooperation, but I realize that I should be thankful. This has prompted me to further my research and try different things, like performing passive onsite tests on real deployments in cities like Seattle, New York, and Washington DC. I’m not so sure these cities are equally as thankful, since they have to deal with thousands of installed vulnerable devices, which are currently being used for critical traffic control.

The latest Sensys Networks numbers indicate that approximately 200,000 sensor devices are deployed worldwide. See http://www.trafficsystemsinc.com/newsletter/spring2014.html. Based on a unit cost of approximately $500, approximately $100,000,000 of vulnerable equipment is buried in roads around the world that anyone can hack. I’m also concerned about how much it will cost tax payers to fix and replace the equipment.

One way I confirmed that Sensys Networks devices were vulnerable was by traveling to Washington DC to observe a large deployment that I got to know, as this video shows: 



When I exited the train station, the fun began, as you can see in this video. (Thanks to Ian Amit for the pictures and videos.)



Disclaimer: no hacking was performed. I just looked at wireless data with a wireless sniffer and an access point displaying it graphically using Sensys Networks software along with sniffer software; no data was modified and no protections were bypassed. I just confirmed that communications were not encrypted and that sensors and repeaters could be completely controlled with no authentication necessary.

Maybe the devices are intentionally vulnerable so that the Secret Service can play with them when Cadillac One is around. :)

As you can see, Washington DC and many cities around the world will remain vulnerable until Sensys Networks takes action. In the meantime, I really hope no one does hack these devices causing traffic problems and accidents.

I would recommend a close monitoring of these systems, watch for any malfunction, and always have secondary controls in place. These types of devices should be security audited before being used to avoid this kind of problems and to increase their security. Vendors should also be required, in some way, to properly document and publish the security controls, functionality, and so on, of their products in order to quickly determine if they are good and secure.

See you at DEFCON!


By the way, I will also be at IOAsis (http://ioasislasvegas.eventbrite.com/?aff=PRIOASIS), so come through for a discussion and demo.